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Abstract 
This article explores how Rousseau’s gendered rendering of education prepares women for a life 
of slavery, primarily by holding them captive to the power of vanity. An understanding of the 
process of enslavement begins with an appreciation of Rousseau’s conceptualization of freedom 
and the general will in The Social Contract, followed by a discursive analysis of his guidelines for 
the proper and desired education of men and women in Émile, including the pivotal role played by 
vanity in the inculcation of young women. The paper concludes by underscoring how Rousseau’s 
description of the ideal education for women not only contradicts his definition of what it means to 
be fully human, it also replaces women’s liberty and morality with vanity, thereby framing a 
woman’s role and purpose in life in language the political philosopher usually reserved for slavery, 
a practice Rousseau purportedly found illegitimate and detrimental to society as a whole. 
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1. Introduction and Literature Review 
He was the victim of great internal tensions and intellectual conflicts. In one mood he 
was a “child of Nature”—impulsive, wayward, self-assertive, violently individualistic 
and almost a practicing anarchist. In another, he was the stern moralist, urging a 
sensitive awareness of duty to serve the common good as the highest civic virtue. So 
his philosophy was, not unnaturally, inconsistent and at times confused (Thomson, 
1966, p. 105). 
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So reads the closing remarks of one historian’s description of Rousseau and his social-political treatises. 
Although few historians, political scientists, philosophers or educational theorists would question the 
impact of Rousseau’s philosophy, many have been baffled by apparent discrepancies in his writings, 
including contradictions internal to his political philosophy (Martin, 1981, p. 359; Canivez, 2004, p. 394). 
Of particular concern is Rousseau’s depiction of women, which, depending on the scholar, has been 
criticized for bias in its inferior portrayal of women to outright misogyny including accusations that the 
philosopher’s arguments rationalized rape (Darling & Van de Pijpekamp, 1994, pp. 124-127). Critical 
discussion regarding the political philosopher’s treatment of women dates back to near contemporaries of 
Rousseau, most famously Mary Wollstonecraft’s landmark A Vindication of the Rights of Women, a 
step-by-step refutation of Rousseau’s thought beginning with the presupposition that women lack natural 
faculties such as reason with which to be full and equal citizens with men, including in the classroom 
through coeducation ([1792] 1994); indeed Wollstonecraft is credited with a sophisticated and holistic 
view of education that falls prey neither to rational instrumentalism nor the romanticism of Rousseau 
(Griffiths, 2014, p. 349). More recent theorists like Jane Roland Martin have underscored the dangers of 
Rousseau and similar philosophers of education that perpetuate the status quo through exclusionary 
practices that define education in terms of men rather than all human beings (1981, p. 371; 1985). Others 
have gone so far as to accuse the philosopher of relegating women to an “ontological basement” (Darling 
& Van de Pijpekamp citing Martin, 1994, p. 131). 
While few scholars dispute that Rousseau’s views on women are not unproblematic, some have 
suggested that the philosopher’s portrayal of women has either been overstated or misrepresented and 
bears further contextualization (Weiss, 1990, pp. 604-605; Jonas, 2016, p. 145; Mulcahy, 2018, pp. 
88-89). One interpretation, for example, proposes that the political philosopher’s views on women are 
neither “bizarre inconsistency in his philosophical reasoning” nor “unabashed misogyny” but rather 
rooted in the belief that “men and women will be happiest when they inhabit certain sex roles—not 
because sex roles are valuable in themselves but because only through them can either men or women 
hope to be happy” (Jonas, 2016, p. 145). If “sexual role differentiation is not necessarily (italics in 
original) oppressive” in and of themselves, then the question remains as to whether or not Rousseau falls 
into the “different but equal category” (Lange, 1979, p. 42). A related question that bears exploration is to 
what extent and for what ends are the differences between men and women “damnable” or “to be 
celebrated” in terms of their “practical compability” (sic) “with equality, community, and social 
freedom” (Weiss, 1990, p. 625). Indeed another scholar suggests that “the central and distinctive 
difficulty of Rousseau’s social thought” is “the problem of finding a stable equilibrium between 
denaturing education, political stability and adult autonomy” (Riley, 2011, p. 573). It follows that a 
particularly instructive point of entry into disentangling and clarifying Rousseau’s complicated and 
contradictory writings on the differences between men and women would thus be an analysis of the 
manner in which educational sites become gendered (Weiler, 2006, p. 161).  
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2. Overview and Major Findings 
This paper makes a unique contribution to ongoing critical analysis of Rousseau’s confounding 
portrayal of women by discursively analyzing the pivotal role that vanity plays in the gendering of their 
education and eventual enslavement. Such enslavement cannot be properly understood without a 
broader appreciation of what constituted freedom for Rousseau. The paper thus begins with a textual 
analysis of Rousseau’s definition of man and his sense of freedom in society through the general will as 
outlined in The Social Contract. The interrelationship between man, education and preparation for 
participation in the general will as advocated in Émile will next be explored, followed by a discursive 
analysis of Rousseau’s ideal education for women and the integral role played by the inculcation of 
vanity in their instruction. The conclusion elucidates how this gendered rendering of education not only 
contradicts ideals that form the basis of Rousseau’s political philosophy as well as his vision of 
education, it does so in a way that frames the education of women with the same values and lack of 
agency the philosopher usually reserved for slaves, and in so doing, enslaves society as a whole. 
 
3. The Social Contract, the General Will and the Education of Men 
“To renounce liberty is to renounce being a man, to surrender the rights of humanity and even its 
duties” (Rousseau [1762], 1913, p. 7). For Rousseau, nature intended man to be free, and no man gives 
up his freedom willingly. The Social Contract carefully delineates how no one has natural authority 
over another. The rule of nature is the only rule that man should live by, and it includes two principles: 
benevolence and self-preservation. Man is not compelled by impulse, property or reason. To Rousseau, 
man is simply a relaxed, complacent brute, but he is happy and free, and his freedom is without 
structured content because it is free of learning. 
“What specifically distinguishes man from all other animals is not so much his intelligence as the fact 
that he is a free agent” (Bair, 1974, p. 153). For Rousseau, it is thus not simply enough to say that man 
is “free”; rather, he is a self-directed agent in his freedom. His choices reconstruct the surrounding 
world, and, over time, can result in a fundamental change in man’s very essence. Such change is 
evident in man as he gradually placed himself in society. Rousseau cannot explain why man was 
attracted to society (not being naturally inclined to it), but he does feel this transition was unfortunate. 
For society perverts one’s freedom by not accepting it and stifling it through various social institutions. 
While a truly free man lives within himself, social man is always “outside himself, can live only in the 
opinion of others, and it is only from their judgment that he draws, so to speak, the feeling of his own 
existence” (Bair, 1974, p. 200). Rousseau calls this vanity, or the evaluation of one’s own actions 
through another’s eyes; vanity generates shame, envy, and ultimately the loss of freedom. Man in 
society lives contrary to the laws of nature. His natural benevolence has been corrupted by his own 
knowledge. Since “socialized” man cannot be transported back to the brutish state of nature, man’s 
freedom must be regained another way, through what Rousseau calls the “general will”. 
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“The problem is to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common 
force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with all, may 
still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before” (Thomson, 1966, p. 96). This quote from The 
Social Contract illuminates several important features of the general will. Foremost, the general will 
“forces” each citizen to recognize his freedom through self-legislation. That is, each individual under 
the general will is both sovereign (by participating in the formation of laws) and subject (by following 
those laws he has legislated for himself and the community). A citizen under the general will thus 
forfeits natural liberty to gain civil liberty. This general will establish a proper authority of a completely 
different nature than a Hobbsian “Leviathan” or “commonwealth” (Curley, 1994). For the general will 
not only defines liberty and justice, it does so in such a way that it provides man with those principles 
according to which he can again become free. Thus, by creating the general will Rousseau has 
confronted two potential problems, that of metaphysics (the maintenance of individual autonomy) and 
politics (impersonal authority) (Dyke, 1928, pp. 22-27). 
Furthermore, in order to fully appreciate the general will, one must realize that it is more than a 
practical corrective for the societal perversion of man’s freedom: the general will generates both legal 
and moral equality. The general will also embodies standards of morality by pursuing a “common 
good”. This common good is not attained in a nationalistic mode of voting where majority rules; rather, 
it is achieved through debate and ultimately consensus concerning what will be good for the entire 
community; in this way, the general will is inherently intersubjective, emerging only through 
interaction with other members (Canivez, 2004, p. 404). Instinct is replaced by justice, thereby giving 
man’s actions the morality they lacked, and creating men free instead of slaves to vanity. Thus, the 
general will is both a legal and moral vehicle in which each individual associates himself with the 
whole while retaining his individual freedom. In this way, participation in the general will is both 
integrative (by increasing one’s sense of belongingness to the extant community) and educative (by 
forcing man to be free as master of impersonal laws that are good for all) (Pateman, 1970, pp. 24-27). 
While The Social Contract describes man’s nature and sense of freedom as seen in the general will, 
Émile explains how to raise citizens so that they are effective participants in the general will. The 
relationship between Rousseau’s definition of man (in the general will) and education is briefly 
explored below. Considered by some as one of the pillars of modern pedagogy, Émile invokes several 
of the ideals of Platonic education, including the notion of education as the pursuit of self-knowledge 
(Cavinez, 2004, p. 395; Storey, 2009, p. 251; Osterwalder, 2012, p. 435). A critical function of 
education is the inculcation of freedom from corrupting influences, particularly the sway of one’s 
passions (Nichols, 1985, p. 536; Cress & Gay, 1987, p. xv; Tröhler, 2012, pp. 483-486). Rousseau 
believed that the kind of government in which the general will is master presupposes the right kind of 
education. This education comes from three sources: nature, which man cannot control; “things”, which 
man can partially control; and man, which theoretically man should be able to control. As things are it 
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is impossible to make a youth both a man and a citizen, for education must be in opposition to either 
nature or various institutions in society. Education defined by nature is private and makes a man who is 
valued in and of himself, and whose relationships are only between him and other men. On the other 
hand, education defined by society is public and makes a citizen who is valued in relation to society, 
and whose relationships reside in society. 
Rousseau believes that good citizens will ultimately lead to good men. A good citizen is one whose 
freedom possesses “content”, for freedom informed by content enables man to act responsibly through 
the general will. The purpose of education is to give content to man’s freedom and to equip him with a 
sense of such concepts as liberty and justice that will confront him later as he participates in the general 
will. However, Rousseau’s definition of man and his sense of freedom as expressed in the general will 
contradicts his description of the proper education for women in Émile. The next portion of this paper 
recounts this education, and then demonstrates how it is discrepant with Rousseau’s definition of man 
in The Social Contract. 
 
4. Émile, the Education of Women and the Pleasing of Men  
The following excerpt from Émile describes one of woman’s inherent weaknesses, her natural gluttony 
and greediness: 
I said that Sophie was a glutton. She was naturally so. The case is not the same for 
girls as for boys... It is too dangerous to be left unchecked. When little Sophie went 
into her mother’s cupboard as a child, she did not always come back emptyhanded, 
and her fidelity was not above every temptation so far as sugarplums and bonbons 
were concerned (Rousseau [1762], 1979, p. 395). 
Most of Émile, with regard to the proper education of women, reads in such a fashion. The reason for 
including this passage was to give the reader an appropriate feel for the text, because the following 
description of this education may appear florid in parts-as Rousseau’s was. This paper will follow 
Rousseau’s argument of first describing the characteristics and duties of women, followed by their early 
education, later training, and finally the products of such an education. It should also be noted that all 
of the education in Émile, including the education of young men as well as young women, delineated 
individual education by the tutorial method as the ideal upbringing for a child. For Rousseau, this 
portends as complete a separation as possible from all the ordinary social ties to family, neighborhood 
and state, an approach decried by some scholars as unnatural (Ozar, 2015, p. 91). 
Rousseau begins his description of women and their duties by saying that “... woman is made 
specifically to please man... woman is made to please and be subjugated” (Rousseau [1762], 1979, p. 
398). If men happen to please women, it is less of a necessity that they do so. All their lives women 
require patience, sweetness, zeal, and affection. The guiding rule in educating women is to follow 
nature, and nature intended that women should improve their understandings in order to be fit 
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companions of men. Thus, a woman should be taught only what is useful for her to know. Having 
described women and some of their duties, Rousseau then gives a brief overview of preferred early 
studies for women. 
Rousseau suggests that the early education of women should be conducted in a convent. As for 
playthings, jewelry and especially dolls should be made available to the little girl. Jewelry should be 
provided to play with because a woman’s purpose is to please, and the physical part of that pleasing lies 
in adornment. The doll, too, is the “special entertainment” of this sex. For occupation with a doll gives 
a girl miniature training in her life’s work. Furthermore, in wishing to make her doll attractive, the girl 
learns to earn the good will of others by her own industry. This industry is important to foster in a girl’s 
youth since her later “harsh dependence” on her husband may encourage complacency. Rousseau 
concludes this section on a young girl’s early education by saying that girls should only be taught those 
subjects that will later be useful to her in pleasing men. 
Rousseau then discusses the proper “training” of women; like the text, this paper will divide such 
training into social, religious, and moral training. Socially, girls should be trained to speak what pleases, 
for “... talent at speaking holds first place in the art of pleasing” (Rousseau [1762], 1979, p. 378). 
Discretion is advised for a young girl’s religious training, for they are even less able to form an idea of 
Divinity than boys when young. Besides, since women must live under the rule of authority it is not so 
important to explain to them their belief as to prescribe and describe it concisely. 
“Idleness and disobedience are the two most dangerous defects for them (women)...” (Rousseau [1762], 
1979, p. 369). So begins Rousseau’s advice for the moral training of young girl’s. As they are so prone 
to such laziness and incorrigibility, girls must be taught to be energetic and industrious. Furthermore, 
since subjugation is their lot in life, young girls must be: 
... exercised in constraint, so that it never costs them anything to tame all their 
caprices in order to submit them to the wills of others... Dissipation, frivolity, and 
inconstancy are defects that easily arise from the corruption and continued indulgence 
of their (young girl’s) first tastes. To prevent this abuse, teach them above all to 
conquer themselves. Amidst our senseless arrangements a decent woman’s life is a 
perpetual combat against herself (Rousseau [1762], 1979, p. 369). 
Thus, girls should be taught constraint from the earliest years; their “fancies” must be crushed to 
subject them to the will of others, for that is the type of life they must eventually lead. 
Finally, in the moral training of women it is especially important to allow young girls very little liberty, 
since they “... never cease to be subjected to a man or the judgements of men” (Rousseau [1762], 1979, 
p. 370). Girls are also inclined to carry what little liberty they do have to excess. A young girl’s 
eagerness for amusement should also be checked, for it is the source of a woman’s fickleness. While 
one can allow young girls to indulge in gaiety and laughter, they should not be free from restraint of 
their entire lives. Such restraint develops in women a good temper that will make it easier later for 
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women to obey men; for a woman “... ought to learn early to endure even injustice and to bear a 
husband’s wrongs without complaining” (Rousseau [1762], 1979, p. 370). 
And what will the products of this mode of education be as the young girl embarks on her 
“womanhood” (at about the age of fifteen)? Rousseau lists several, beginning with the acquisition of 
temperance, even though young women are greedy and gluttonous by nature. The young woman will 
also have a mind that is “... agreeable without being brilliant, and solid without being profound” 
(Rousseau [1762], 1979, p. 395). Though her mind may be less accurate and penetrating, a women’s 
temper is easy but uneven. Her religion should be simple, and broadly speaking, with few dogmas. 
While the end of a man’s education is to make him useful, that of a women’s education is to make her 
agreeable. Ultimately, Rousseau believes, the goal of a women’s education is to please men. 
 
5. Nature, Politics and Society: Defining Men, Subjugating Women and the Prison of Vanity 
The first portion of this paper recounted Rousseau’s definition of man and his sense of freedom in the 
general will in The Social Contract. The relationship between this definition of man and education was 
next explored, as well as the ideal education for women as prescribed in Émile. Examining three 
different states of existence (nature, politics and society), the penultimate portion of this paper 
highlights discrepancies between Rousseau’s definition of man and his description of the proper 
education for women, and the pivotal and powerful role that vanity plays in holding women captive 
through education. 
For Rousseau, the key role played by the general will in effecting man’s freedom through participation 
in it are based on his presuppositions about man in the state of nature. To elaborate, man in the state of 
nature is simply a relaxed, complacent “brute”. He is not compelled by impulse, property, or reason; he 
is simply “there”, and completely free. While this freedom enables him to make choices that 
reconstruct the world around him, it is a freedom devoid of content because it has not been tainted by 
learning. For man to deny this freedom is to renounce his very humanity. Women, on the other hand, 
possess several natural attributes that give their essence and sense of freedom content before any 
learning may have been imposed upon them by society. 
In Rousseau’s words, women are naturally idle and disobedient. They should be allowed very little 
liberty, for their fickle natures carry what little liberty they are given to excess. Nature also intended 
women to increase their understanding only to be fit companions for men. If a woman’s existence is 
defined by man’s needs, then by extension Rousseau is coming dangerously close to placing vanity (or 
the evaluation of oneself through another’s eyes) in the state of nature. Even in the state of nature a 
woman’s essence and sense of freedom have not been given an entirely flattering content. Such content 
may deny women the opportunity to be free agents whose choices reconstruct the world around them. 
Such content may not enable their lives to be free from the natural authority to which Rousseau claims 
everyone in the state of nature is entitled. One begins to wonder if Rousseau ever intended for women 
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to be free, even in the state of nature. For if to renounce one’s freedom is to renounce one’s very 
humanity, and women are not completely free to begin with, are they ever able to be considered fully 
human? Perhaps that is why Rousseau referred to a decent woman’s life as a constant battle against 
herself. Secondly, this contradiction between Rousseau’s definition of man and the proper education for 
women can be explained through the context of politics. Rousseau’s concept of the general will was 
constructed such that man could regain the freedom that society had stifled; this freedom would be 
regained through self-legislation. Man is forced to be free by being both sovereign and subject, for he 
legislates for himself and his community those laws that he must live by. Yet how can women ever 
regain this lost freedom (if it was even theirs to begin with) if they are not allowed to legislate for 
themselves? According to Rousseau, women must lead lives of harsh dependence on their husbands. 
Women should be given very little liberty since they never cease to be subjected to the judgments of 
man, even if it includes bearing a husband’s injustice. In this light, Rousseau’s hope that the general 
will would come from all and apply to all have been frustrated by his description of women according 
to his vision of their proper education as advocated in Émile. 
Furthermore, this general will is not only a legal vehicle for man’s freedom, it is a moral vehicle as well. 
It is fully a general will, in an idealized sense, only when it “aims at the common good and when it is 
spontaneously supported by all citizens of good will who have at heart whatever reason and experience 
and their own private consciences tell them is for the common good” (Thomson, 1966, p. 97). If a 
woman is not given the opportunity to fully experience life and exercise her reason (if she even has any) 
but can only experience particular events allowed to her, and if women must assume a mind that is 
agreeable and without depth, how can she ever participate in this common good? Is even a woman’s 
sense of morality prescribed to her? This is an oddity considering the importance Rousseau places on 
motherhood in Émile. 
Finally, Rousseau’s definition of man in The Social Contract and his description of the proper 
education for women in Émile contradict themselves in a social context. For the goal of a woman’s 
education is to please men. This was encouraged in social gatherings through the “art of speaking” 
(speak only that which pleases men). This pleasing was additionally encouraged by a young girl’s 
playthings (jewelry and dolls, so as to nurture in young girls an awareness of being physically 
appealing to men); this pleasing was also fostered by the subjects a young girl must study (young girls 
should study only that which will make them “useful” companions for men). As such, a woman’s very 
existence and the goals of her education in Émile were defined by her relationship to man. 
Rousseau’s depiction of women is both Marxist and utilitarian in implication, the former through their 
objectification and alienation, the latter by defining women in terms of their means (the art of pleasing 
men) as opposed to ends in themselves. In this way, a woman’s education and the life for which it is 
preparing her are essentially dictated by that which Rousseau abhorred most of all: vanity. To reiterate, 
vanity is the appraisal or evaluation of one’s thoughts, actions and values through another’s eyes such 
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that over time these concerns and behaviors are no longer one’s own but rather defined by the people 
around him or her. Configured around the pleasing of men, Rousseau’s proscribed education of women 
is nothing less than an exercise in vanity. Even if some scholars, as mentioned at the beginning of this 
article, can justify Rousseau’s sexual role differentiation and portrayal of women through further 
explication and deeper contextualization, her slavery still stands to reason: A woman cannot be true 
even to an “ontologically debased” version of herself if it is forever subject to the estimation of others.  
 
6. Conclusion: Women, Dehumanization and Slavery 
If women are not to be considered fully free and to not be so renounces one’s very humanity, then what 
are women being portrayed as in the philosophical writings of Rousseau? Perhaps Rousseau described 
women’s plight best in his section on slavery in The Social Contract: 
To renounce liberty is to renounce being a man, to surrender the rights of humanity 
and even its duties. For him who renounces everything no indemnity is possible. Such 
a renunciation is incompatible with man’s nature; to remove all liberty from his will 
is to remove all morality from his acts. It is an empty and contradictory convention 
that sets up, on the one side, absolutely authority, and, on the other, unlimited 
obedience... From whatever aspect we regard the question, the right of slavery is null 
and void not only as being illegitimate, but also because it is absurd and meaningless 
(Rousseau [1762], 1913, pp. 7-9). 
By his own definition of humanity, Rousseau is essentially renouncing a woman’s by removing her 
liberty and morality through education, and replacing it with vanity as proscribed in Émile. Such 
debasement, ironically, also undermines what Rousseau saw as one of the great virtues of education, 
which is the capacity for liberation through the removal of social blinders and the unfettering of self by 
empathetically imagining the other (White, 2008; Scott, 2012, p. 464). Further, while women obviously 
bear the burden of dehumanization, they are not the only ones who become enslaved. As Rousseau 
stated, “For what right can my slave have against me, when all that he has belongs to me, and his right 
being mine, this right of mine against myself is a phrase devoid of meaning?” (Rousseau, 1913, p. 7) 
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